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CAN

FEDERAL

SANCTIONS

FORCE

STATES TO CLEAN THEIR AIR
MISSOURI V. UNITED STATES 1
by Theodore A. Kardis
1. IN1RODUCTION
The Clean Air Act is one of the most
pervasive and complex pieces of environmental legislation on the books today. Many states are struggling to meet
its guidelines. Some are facing sanctions for failure to comply, while others
have already felt the sting of EPA's
whip. This non-traditional casenote explores a pending dispute between the
state of Missouri and the federal govemment over Congress' constitutional
authority to implement the Clean Air Act
vis-a-vis the states.

11.FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When Governor Mel Cornahan
signed Senate Bill 590 into law on June
3, 1994, he not only approved the Air
Quality Attainment Act (AQAA), but also
set a lawsuit into motion. The AQAA
was intended to bring Missouri into compliance with the federal Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, which requires
the implementation of a basic vehicle
inspection and maintenance (I&M) program by virtue of St. Louis' classification

as a "moderate" nonantainment area for
ozone.2
The impetus for this legislative action
can be traced to two EPA findings that
cite deficiencies in Missouri's State ImIn January
plementation Plan (SIP).
1993, EPA formally charged Missouri
with failure to submit a revised I&M program.' One year later, EPA, again,
brought charges against Missouri. This
time it was due to an incomplete VOC
(volatile organic compound) reduction
plan.4 Inorder to remedy these deficiencies and avoid sanctions, the Legislature
passed S.B. 590, thereby establishing
the AQAA. An amendment to the bill,
however, put a twist on the AQAA's implementation. The terms of the amendment specify that the AQAA shall not
take effect until a particularly described
lawsuit isfiled in federal court by the attorney general on behalf of the state of
Missouri.5
The amendment, codified at Mo. REv.
STAT. § 643.360, states that the lawsuit
must request injunctive relief and must
challenge the EPA's legal authority to

impose sanctions threatened by the EPA
pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' Specific
allegations for the lawsuit were also suggested, including the general allegation
that the sanctions potentially imposed on
the St. Louis air quality control region by
virtue of its nonattainment status were
unreasonable in relation to the standards
which determined that status. 7 Specifically, the Legislature suggested that substantial evidence does not exist to relate
St. Louis' air quality to the potential sanctions. 8 In support of the allegation that
the standards are arbitrary, the Legislature set out factual allegations stating
that only one of the seventeen St. Louis
monitoring sites has registered more than
the allowed number of exceedances
over the last three years; and that purely
local causes are responsible for the exceedances at the one site, thus making it
an inappropriate barometer of St. Louis
air quality.9 In support of the allegation
that the potential sanctions are arbitrary,
the Legislature offered several factual allegations, including the existence of local causes at the one site registering
exceedances; that Missouri should be
given timeto correct those exceedances;
that the expenditure of $125 million to
cure the exceedances at the one site is
unreasonable; and that the mandatory
15% volatile organic compound (VOC)
emission reduction might unreasonably
require an emission reduction beyond
attainment status.10
The Legislature's suggested allegations took a beating during the summer
of 1994, just after Governor Carnahan
had signed S.B. 590 into law. Of the

I No. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF (E.D.Mo. filed Nov. 4, 1994).

See infro notes 2629 and accompanying text.
3
Plaintitfs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3,Missouri v. United States (E.D.Mo.lNo. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Proposed
Findings].
4
Id.
SAT. § 643.360 (1994).
s Mo. REv.
6
Id.
7 Id. The amended portion of the statute requires plaintiff to show why the EPA sanctions are unreasonable in relation to the standards by proving: 1)these isno
sufficient evidence of a rational relation between ambient air and the penalties the state isseeking; 2) both the standards and the penalties are arbitrary; 3)the
penalties are arbitrary and unreasonable for other reasons listed in the statute. Id.
I Id.at § 643.360[1).
9 Id.at § 643.360121[a), (211b).
10 Id. at § 643.36013]a-{dl.
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seventeen monitoring stations throughout
the St. Louis area, none can exceed the
maximum VOC level more than three
times during a three year period." By
the end of the summer of 1994, one site
had recorded five violations, another
four, and many others had recorded
two. 12 This means that the St. Louis region will be upgraded from a
"moderate" nonattainment area to a
"serious" nonattainment area unless no
ozone violations are recorded during
1996.13

Missouri's regulatory woes were further complicated by a July 1994 EPA
finding that Missouri's SIP was deficient
in regards to another criteria pollutant,
nitrogen oxides (NO.).i Missouri must
make a SIP revision which incorporates
reasonably available control technology
(RACT) to all major NO. sources in the
St. Louis nonattainment area by February
6, 1996 or face sanctions."
Despite a summer full of exceedances
at several different St. Louis monitoring
sites, the Missouri Attorney General took
its lead from the Legislature and filed the
suggested lawsuit on November 4,
1994.i" The case went to trial on No-

vember 21, although no orders have yet
been issued.' 7 The amendment to the
AQAA provides that the act shall not be
implemented as long as a temporary restraining order or injunction isin effect,' 8
however, no restraining order or temporary injunction was requested based on

the court's agreement to pursue an expedited decision. Nonetheless, as of this
writing no decision has been handed
down, and Missouri's determination not
to seek a preliminary injunction becomes
more significant in the interim preceding
a ruling on the permanent injunction.

Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Relevant Clean Air
Act Provisions
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the
EPA to adopt nationally uniform ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants, one of which is
ozone." The CAA further requires states
to develop and submit state implementation plans (SIPs) to EPA for approval.2o
The SIP must specify measures to assure
that air quality within the state will meet
the NAAQS. 2' Generally, a SIP must
assign specific emission limitations to
individual sources; establish timetables
for compliance by those sources; set up
procedures to review new sources; establish systems to monitor air quality;
The
and provide for enforcement.
CAA even provides a process for defining the measures necessary for achieving
the NAAQS: first, inventory emissions
and project expected growth to establish
the extent of the problem; second,
choose control strategies for reducing
emissions; and third, demonstrate that
such measures will be adequate to
achieve the NAAS (e.g. using

modeling).23 Once a SIP has been approved by the EPA, it is promulgated as
a federal regulation, enforceable by the
public. Moreover, the SIP system is a
dynamic process; most states, including
Missouri, amend their SIPs annually.
While the CAA was enacted in
1970, the 1977 CAA Amendments
were significant in that they separated
the country into areas not yet achieving
the NAAS ("nonattainment" areas),
and areas in which air quality was better than the NAAQS (PSDs (for
"Prevention of Significant Deterioration")).2' The 1990 CAA Amendments
made significant changes in the nonattainment and PSD programs. Whereas
the nonattainment program established
in 1977 required "reasonable further
progress" but left the term vaguely defined, the 1990 amendments allow the
Administrator to require annual incremental reductions in emissions.25 The
1990 Amendments even established a
series of provisions relating specifically
to ozone nonattainment areas which
classified the areas into "marginal,"
"moderate," "serious," "severe," and
"extreme," and established attainment
deadlines for each.26 As the St. Louis
air quality control region iscurrently classified as "moderate" nonottoinment area
for ozone,2 7 and is at significant risk of
being reclassified as "serious," an overview of the mandated measures for each
of these classifications isin order.

" William Allen, Ozone levels Enter Danger Zone Here Area Could Face Federal Sanctions, ST.LouIs PosT DisPATCH, Aug. 21, 1994, at 01D.
12

Id.

12 Id.

"

Plaintiff's Proposed Findings, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
Plaintiffs Proposed Findings, supra note 3.
Fred Lindecke, Trial Over Emissions Tests To Be Closely Watched, ST.

i

Mo. REv. Sw. § 643.360.

14
iS
16

LOUs Post DISPATCH,
Nov.

18, 1994, at 09D

io 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). Ozone, a criteria pollutant, isused as an indicator for smog. The source pollutant isa group of chemicals known as volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), which react with nitrogen oxides (NO.) to produce smog.
" 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp.11 I990).
21 Id.
22

23

Id.
Id.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 74707492 (19881lising PSD area requirements); Id. §§ 7501-7508 (listing nonaltainment area requirements).
42 U.S.C. § 7501 (Supp. 111990).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-751 Il (Supp. 111990).
' Plaintiff's Proposed Findings, supro note 3, at 2. The Si. Louis area was so designated on November 6, 1991. Id.
24
2
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If an area has been classified as a
"moderate" nonattainment area, it must
submit to EPA an inventory of actual
emissions from all sources and revise it
every three years; apply a reasonably
available control technology (RACT) program to many VOC sources; implement
a vehicle emission control inspection and
maintenance (I&M) program; implement
new source permitting programs; submit
a SIP that will reduce VOCs fifteen percent in six years; and require the installation of gasoline vapor recovery systems
at gas stations." If an area has been
classified as a "serious" nonattainment
area, it must comply with all "moderate"
area requirements (which incidentally are
partially defined by the "marginal" area
requirements) as well as implement a SIP
with enhanced monitoring; make an
attainment demonstration of the new
SIP's effectiveness to the EPA using modeling or another approved analytical
method; demonstrate a three percent
reduction in baseline emissions each
year, averaged over a three year period; implement an enhanced vehicle
I&M program; incorporate a transportation control program into the SIP; and
revise the SIP to include a clean-fuel vehicle program."
Another crucial provision added by
the 1990 CAA Amendments provides
for sanctions to be levied against the
states for failure to attain the NAAQS. 0

Grounds for sanctions include failure to
submit a SIP for a nonattainment area,
failure to submit a SIP which includes all
the required elements of a nonattainment
SIP for that area and which meets certain minimum criteria, failure of the SIP
to meet the proscribed nonattainment
elements, failure to make other required
submissions, and failure to implement the
approved SIP." This starts the running
of the "sanctions clock."3 2 If one of
these grounds exists, the state has eighteen months to correct the deficiency." If
at that point the deficiency isstill not corrected, the EPA must impose one of two
sanctions. 3 However, if there is a lack
of good faith on the part of the state or if
the state isstill noncompliant after an additional six months, both sanctions will
apply until complianceis achieved.S
There are two sanctions: highway
sanctions and offsets.3 The highway
sanction allows the EPA to cut off federal
funding to the area with the exception of
sofetyrelated projects.3 However, the
EPA has the authority to approve certain
projects which it finds would improve air
quality.3" The offsets sanction would
increase the offset ratio required in new
source permitting to 2:1 ." The EPA has
decided that the offset sanction will apply eighteen months after the finding of a
deficiency, and the highway sanction six
months after that.o40 While the imposition
of these sanctions is mandatory at the

28

42 U.S.C. § 751 lalb) (Supp. II1990); Id. § 751 lola).

"

Id.§§7511alaHc).

3
3'

42 U.S.C. § 7509 ISupp. It 1990).
Id. § 7509 a).
See 40 C.F.R. § 52.31 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (Supp. 1119901.
Id.

2
32
34

3S Id.
3
Id.
3 Id.

proscribed intervals, the EPA has the
authority to impose them sooner."
Furthermore, this authority allows the EPA
to expand the sanctions to the entire
state, as opposed to only the nonattainment area. 42
B. Case Law
1. Tenth Amendment
The first of Missouri's legal challenges to the federal government's sanction authority is based on the Tenth
Amendment, which reads: "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." 3 The
Tenth Amendment has meant different
things to the Supreme Court at different
times in its history, thus an examination
of the various judicial interpretations of
the Amendment is crucial.
Early Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
seemed to clearly indicate that it did not
constitute a limitation on the congressional exercise of powers delegated by
the Constitution." Later, in the 1930s, it
was used by the Court as one of many
grounds for invalidating New Deal legislation, 45 but this practice was soon
abandoned. 6 Insofar as it operated as
a check upon federal power, the Tenth
Amendment laid dormant for a long period which ended suddenly with the
modern day Supreme Court decision,

§ 7509b).
§ 75091bl1)[A).

Id. § 75091bl1113).
Id. § 75091b)[2).
40 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(dHI1) (1994).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 74101m) (Supp. It 19901.
42 Id.
3

3

'

U.S. Cots. amend. X.

See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (18241; McCulloch v. Mayland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404-07 (1819); and Martin v. Hunter's lessee, I
Wheat. 304,
324-25 (1816).
A See, e.g., Carter v.Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"
See, e.g. NIRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 111937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
U
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NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery.Y' In
National league of Cities, the Supreme
Court invalidated portions of the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) as violative of the Tenth
Amendment." 8 Specifically, the Court
held that the FLSA amendments
"operate[d] to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."49
The Court
recognized that the Tenth Amendment
stood for the proposition that
"...Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system." 50 The Court held
that the FLSA amendments interfered with
traditional aspects of state sovereignty,
one of which was the substantial costs
imposed upon the states by the amendments.51
However, a four member
dissent vehemently opposed the concepithat the Tenth Amendment places
independent limits on federal power,
calling
it
an
"ill-conceived
abstraction. 52
The position of the National League
of Cities dissent would ultimately win out
nearly a decade later, but in the meantime the Court continued to refine its new
found application of the Tenth Amendment. A particularly important decision
is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc. s Hodel
o7
49
49
50
S)
52
S3
54
5
56
57
so
so
60
61
62
63
64
6s
66

involved a Tenth Amendment challenge
to the Surface Mining Control and Reclomotion Act." Although the Court did
not find that the legislation was invalid, it
set forth and applied three requirements
for a successful Tenth Amendment challenge.ss The first requirement is a
"showing that the challenged statute
regulates the 'States as States."' 56 The
second requires that "the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably
'attribute[s]
of
state
57
sovereignty."'
The third requirement is
that "it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability 'to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions. "'5 The Court
applied this test in a few subsequent decisions,S9 until the Tenth Amendment tide
turned in 1985.
The vacillation of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence continued when the Supreme Court overruled National League
of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoliton Transit Authority.'o The Court
rejected the prior analysis of whether a
particular state governmental function
was "integral" or "traditional". 6 1 In deciding to overrule precedent, the Court
seemed frustrated with the application of
the doctrine first put forward by National
League of Cities. It noted that while
National League of Cities had attempted
to use the Tenth Amendment to place a

limit on Congress' power, articulating
this limit "in terms of core governmental
functions and fundamental attributes of
state sovereignty," that doctrine had
"underestimated ... the solicitude of the
national political process for the continued vitality of the States."'62
The Court concluded that the National
League of Cities model was unnecessary, "impracticable," and "doctrinally
barren.",6 However, a four justice dissent, composed of the remaining members of the National League of Cities
majority, decried the abandonment of its
model and pronounced that Garcia
"effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric...."6
In the wake of Garcia, it seemed as
though the Tenth Amendment imposed
no restrictions on Congress regulating
the states as states. However, the Court
would define some limits on Congressional power in New York v. United
States." Interestingly, the Court again
visited the Tenth Amendment in the context of a challenge to environmental legislation, this time the Low-level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act."6 Responding to speculation over the demise
of the Tenth Amendment, the Court explained that while it does indeed restrain
the power of Congress, the limitation
does not spring directly from the text of
the amendment, which is simply a
"tautology."67 Rather, as the Court

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id.

Id.of 852.
Id.al 842-34 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
Id.of 845-46.
Id.at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
Id.

Id.at 287-88.
Id.at 287 (quoting National league of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
Id.at 287-88 (quoting Notional league of Ciies, 426 U.S. at 845).
Id.at 288 (quoting National league of Cies at 852).
See United Transportation Union v. Long Island RR. Co., 455 U.S. 678 119821; EEOC v.Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226(19831.
469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court explicitly stated: *Natonal league of Cities v.Usery, ..., isoverruled.' Id.at 557.
Id.at 54647.

Id.at 55657.
Id.at 557.
Id.at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Actually, Justice Blackmun, who concurred inNaional league of Cities, defected to write the majority opinion inGarcia.
1l 2 S.C. 2408 (19921.
td.
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elucidated, it "confirms that the power of
the Federal Government issubject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the states.""
More specifically, the Court characterized the issue
before it as "whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to
regulate in a particular field or in a particular way."6 The Court proceeded to
identify the principles which guided such
an inquiry.
In identifying the first such principle,
the Court resurrected the utility of Hodel,
a pre-Garcia decision, by citing its language: "Congress may not simply
'commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."' 70 The other major principle identified by the Court is that
Congress, using methods "short of outright coercion," may "encourage a State
to regulate in a particular way...."7
One such method, better discussed under the Spending Clause, is the attachment of conditions to the receipt of
federal funds.72 The other constitutionally permissible method is offering states
the "choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal

Radioactive Waste Policy Act using this
Tenth Amendment analysis. The Court
held that the "take title" provision of the
Act, which forced states to make a
"choice" (sarcasm is the Court's) between accepting ownership of radioactive waste and regulating according to
Congress' instructions, had crossed the
line between encouragement and coercion. Accordingly, the Court severed
the provision from the rest of the Act
since it infringed on the state sovereignty
harbored by the Tenth Amendment. 7s
While the Court has returned to a narrowly defined interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment's limitation on Congressionalpower, the vacillation may not yet be
over. As Chief Justice Rehnquist brazenly put it, National League of Cities
"will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court." 76

the United States; ..... ""7 The question of
whether Congress can use its spending
power to indirectly induce states to regulate has received much treatment by the
Court this century. Generally speaking,
the Court has answered this question in
the offirmative.78
In particular, the Court has held that
"Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds,"' and that
these conditions can influence the legislative choices of states.80 In New York,
the Court refined these pronouncements,
stating that "[sluch conditions must
(among other requirements) bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending."i The Court gave the rationale for this rule, explaining that without
it, the spending powercould "render
academic the Constitution's other grants
and limits of federal authority."82 The
New York Court went on to restate the
other limitations on the spending power:
2. Spending Clause
that the expenditure be for the general
The second of Missouri's legal chal- welfare;83 that the conditions to receipt
lenges to the federal government's sanc- must be unambiguous;" and that the
tion authority is based on the Spending conditions must not violate any indeClause, which reads: "The Congress pendent constitutional prohibition."
shall have power: [t]o lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to IV. SUMM4ARY OF PARTY POSIONS
pay the debts and provide for the comA. Missouri
regulation."
mon defense and general welfare of the
Missouri asserts that the l&M proThe Court actually invalidated one of United States; but all duties, imposts gram will be costly and furthermore that
the provisions of the Low-Level and excises shall be uniform throughout the residents of Missouri will blame their
67

Id. at 24 18.

"

Id.

Id. of 2420.
" Id.(quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
7'
Id. at 2423.
69

"~

Id.

n Id.of 2424.
74 Id. of 2428.
n Id.of 2429, 2434.
76 Garcia 469 U.S. a0580 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
7 U.S. CONs?, cut. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478-80 (1980); Massachusels v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 568-69 (1974); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947).
" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206(19781. Interestingly, Dole concerned Congress' authority to withhold Federal highway funds from slates that refused
to raise their drinking age to 21. The Court did not find this to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' spending power.
*0 New York, 112 S.C. at 2423.
at
32

Id.

Id.

Id. at 2426; see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 64041 (1937).
" Id.; see also Wyoming v.Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427-31 (1946).
a Id.; see also Lawrence County v. LeadDeadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
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State elected officials rather than the federal government for the consequences of
the I&M program. 8 6 Missouri also observes that it is faced with impending
sanctions on several grounds.8 7 Furthermore, Missouri alleges that it has spent
large sums of money in order to elude
sanctions." In support of its request for
an injunction, Missouri argues that
should the EPA impose the offset sanction on the St. Louis nonattainment area,
it would preclude future economic development in that area." According to
Missouri, the offset sanction surpasses
permissible encouragement orinducement and amounts to an unconstitutional
coercion, the faux "choice" prohibited
by New York." Specifically, Missouri
contends that the offset sanction violates
the Tenth Amendment. 91 Irrespective of
the Hobson's choice posed by the offset
sanction, Missouri avers that the sanction
would decrease air quality, thus having
on effect counter to its purpose. 92
With regard to the highway sanction, Missouri makes the intuitive assumption that it will lose funding for many of
its highway construction projects if the
sanction is imposed, thus bringing many
of these projects to a standstill.93 Missouri asserts that the effect of this will
spread from St. Louis to all of Missouri in
the form of unemployment as well as decreases in gross regional product, personal income, and population. 94
Missouri makes the same New York faux

choice argument in response to these
adverse effects, contending that they
bring about an unconstitutional coercion
to regulate under the Clean Air Act as
they are directed to by Congress.9 s Missouri urges that the punitive nature of the
highway sanction, which could potentially cut off all of Missouri's highway
funding, rises beyond the Congressional
inducement permitted by New York to
the level of unconstitutional coercion.96
Thus, Missouri concludes that the highway sanction also violates the Tenth
Amendment.97 Inaddition to making the
Tenth Amendment argument, Missouri
also challenges the highway sanction
based on the Spending Clause. Missouri asserts that its conditional receipt of
federal funds for its highways, based on
its implementation of the federal government's CAA regulatoryscheme, is not
rationally related to any purpose of federal highway funding." Missouri concludes that this is a violation of the
Spending Clause, as interpreted by
New York."9 Peripherally, it also attempts to demonstrate the folly of the
sanctions: that the highway sanction
would lead to traffic congestion and increased auto emissions, thereby having
a counterproductive effect on air
quality.'tm
Finally, in order to satisfy the elements necessary for an injunction, Missouri alleges that it will suffer irreparable
injury in the form of pecuniary loss and

diverted human resources unless the
highway and offset sanctions are both
enjoined, and that no adequate remedy
exists at low for these injuries.101
B. The United States
Missouri complained that the I&M
program would be costly to the states
and its citizens, thereby resulting in political fallout. The United States responded
to this complaint by pointing to the fact
that Missouri chose to shoulder an unnecessary burden by opting to purchase
real estate, buildings, and equipment to
conduct the program itself instead of privatizing it, a cost not required by the
CAA."2 As to Missouri's claim that the

offset sanction would preclude economic
development in the St. Louis nonattainment area, the United States pointed out
that the sanction only applies to new
VOC and NO. sources or such sources
which are seeking a major modification,
concluding that Missouri's assumption
that all VOC and NO. sources will be
affected makes its economic impact assessment unreasonable.103 Furthermore,
the United States explains that even with
the imposition of sanctions, Missouri
couldstill promote economic expansion;
major sources could "net out" by decreasing emissions elsewhere at a single
plant; Missouri could seek approval for
relaxation of its "dual source" definition,
which would release some sources from
the offset requirement; and Missouri

6
Plainfiffs Proposed Findings at 4, Missouri (No. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF).
* Id.
8o Id.at 6.
e Id.at 4.

90

Id. at 4-5, 7.

91 Id. at 8.

Id. o 5.
Id.
9 Id.
s id. o 5-6.
9
Id. of 6.
9
Id. at 7.
9

9

9

Id. of 6.

9

Id. at 7.

11 Id.of 5.
1or Id. at 7-8.

(hereinafter 'Defendants
10 Defendant's Proposed Findings of Foci and Conclusions of Low of 18-19, Missouri v. United States (E.D.Mo.llNo. 4:94 CV 1288 ELF)
Proposed Findlings').
10 Id.at 25.

104
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could also use some of its VOC emission Missouri's contentions that offset sanccredits to attract new sources)" The tions would decrease air quality and that
United States contends that the eco- highway sanctions would lead to connomic impact of any sanctions could be gestion and decreased air quality in
further diminished if existing sources took much the same manner. It attacked the
advantage of the many ways to "avoid" offsetl12 and highway"" counterproducoffset requirements.ios In addition, the tive sanction arguments by characterizUnited States observed that many ing them as unsupported and unrealistic
sources of economic growth do not en- assumptions derived from flowed
tail the production of ozone precursors, methodology.
and would not, therefore, be affected by
Finally, the United States addressed
an offset sanction. 06
Missouri's argument that the highway
The United States argued that the im- sanctions (not the offset sanctions) vioposition of either the highway or offset lated the Spending Clause of the U.S.
sanctions would not violate the Tenth Constitution.
Essentially, the United
Amendment.' 7 In taking this position, States contended that it met the New
the United States suggested that Mis- York requirement that there be "some
souri's claims that the sanctions would relationship" between the condition of
adversely affect its economy are legally implementation of federally mandated
irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment in- regulation and the purposes of the condiquiry.io8 Rather, the United States ar- tional highway funding." 4 The United
gues that New York allows it to States identified this relationship as beencourage particular regulation by the ing between the objective of reducing
states through the use of incentives, and air pollution from cars via encouraging
that it has not taken the impermissible state implementation of I&M programs
step of directly compelling state imple- and the inherent effect of increased vehimentation of a federal regulatory pro- cle use and pollution stemming as a
gram.i 0 9 Furthermore, the United States product from federallyfunded highway
flatly denies Missouri's argument that it construction.IIs
has been given an unconstitutionally coercive choice."o The United States ex- V. COMMENT
pands on this denial by asserting that
A consideration of the objectives of
while Missouri's choice is a difficult one, the parties involved in this lawsuit iscenneither alternative is unconstitutional tral to on understanding of what the fusince Congress can both impose lighter ture may hold for the St. Louis
limits on the dispensation of highway nonattainment area as well as other
funds and dictate more rigid pollution states with air quality control regions excontrols.'
periencing nonattainment problems.
The United States addressed Missouri's case was considerably

stronger from an equitable standpoint
before the multiple exceedances which
occurred in the summer of 1994. The
statutory allegation that the potential
sanctions were arbitrary, due to the fact
that only one site had recorded more
than one exceedance prior to the summer of 1994, made the CAA appear
quite draconian. However, due to the
number of exceedances over the summer, that allegation no longer had a factual basis and was excluded from the
actual suit. This left Missouri with a pair
of tenuous arguments, one based on the
Tenth Amendment, the other on the
Spending Clause. Quite simply, Missouri was forced to prosecute the lawsuit
by its Legislature before it could implement the l&M program. Facing a round
of sanctions, it had no choice but to attempt the challenge.
However, the challenge has held up
the implementation of the enhanced l&M
program. Timing is crucial, since St.
Louis faces reclassification as a "serious"
nonattainment area unless it can better
control VOC and NO. emissions. It is
ironic that both sides agree that the l&M
program is the most effective and efficient way to do so.1 16 In fact, the Missouri DNR has estimated that the l&M
program alone can take St. Louis nearly
halfway to its required emission
reduction."' 7
If this is the case, why is Missouri
dragging its feet by prosecuting this lawsuit? Based on the multiple exceedances
in 1994, there is no reason to believe
that the monitoring stations will remain
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silent this summer when no significant
emissions reduction measures have been
undertaken. Obviously, the I&M program should be implemented immediately if St. Louis is to have any chance of
avoiding reclassification as a "serious"
nonattainment area. Nothing prevents
Missouri from implementing the l&M program while it awaits the outcome of the
suit requesting the injunction. If it expends a significant amount of funds starting up the program and wins the
injunction suit in the meantime, it could
easily pursue a damages remedy at a
later date.
The rhetoric in Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings about the political consequences of the difficult choice Missouri is
faced with seems out of place, at best.
"Missouri's" concern that their state government will be held politically accountable for either the costly and
controversial l&M program or the harsh
sanctions which would follow from failing to implement it is self-interested and
completely irrelevant to the Constitutional
inquiry before the court. This is not to
say that there are no relevant consideralions flowing from the choice between
federally mandated state regulation and
sanctions, but only that the political consequences do not concern the real party
in interest, Missouri.
Missouri's Tenth Amendment challenge isa colorable one, although it certainly would have stood a better chance
under National League of Cities than
under the current standards set forth in
New York. With National League of
Cities, the Tenth Amendment was revitalized as a check on Congressional

power running roughshod over state sovCertainly Missouri would
ereignty.
rather be arguing that compliance with
the CAA would impair its ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. However,
after Garcia overruled National League
of Cities, Missouri is left with the nearly
insurmountable task of convincing a
New York-era court that both of its
"choices" are unconstitutional. The federal government's power to set environmental compliance standards and
encourage states to adopt them using
the highway funds carrot is compelling
and appears uncontroverted, especially
now that the Tenth Amendment has returned to its dormant state. Since Congress chose an indirect method of
inducing states to participate in the
CAA, this is the only part of New York
that Missouri can hang its hat on. Perhaps the Republican Congress or a Supreme Court which has returned the
reins to Chief Justice Rehnquist will come
to Missouri's rescue. Moreover, Missouri isnot the only state to voice its concerns in court - Virginia has brought a
declaratory judgment action which is
currently under consideration by the
Fourth Circuit which raises both of the
constitutional challenges put forward by
It would seem as though
Missouri."
Missouri will have a hard time beating
Virginia to the Supreme Court if the
Court is eager to grant certiorari on this
issue.
Returning to the instant case, the
Spending Clause challenge probably
has a lesser probability of success than
the Tenth Amendment argument. As a

"a Virginio v. United States, 74 F.3d 517 (41h Cir. 1996).
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check on Congressional power, the
Spending Clause is even weaker than
the hibernating Tenth Amendment. Facing a rather static standard, it will be
hard for Missouri to win the argument
that compliance with the CAA is totally
unrelated to the purpose of federal highway funding.
All of this leaves Missouri with a delayed start on its enhanced l&M program, a program which could help pull
St. Louis out of the nonatlainment hole it
has fallen into. For if it is not implemented soon, Missouri isonly looking at
the beginning of its SIP and sanction
problems; reclassification to a "serious"
nonattainment area is imminent.
VI. CONCLUSION
As more and more states experience
CAA compliance difficulties, public attention is sure to be focused on the act
by the lenses of sanctions and increasingly invasive regulation. Although constitutional challenges to the federal
government's authority to impose sanctions as well as strict environmental standards are not likely to meet with success
in the courts under the law as it stands
today, times change. The continuously
vacillating Tenth Amendment could
swing into another active phase. The
combination of a Republican Congress
and President could sign unfunded mandates legislation that would placate the
states with federal funding or decreased
regulation. Clean Air Act reauthorization could weaken its regulatory effectiveness. Only time will tell whether the
Clean Air Act will deliver what its title
promises.

